Governing the Edge, a multi-agent framework for that layer, organized around a data-residency constraint: sensitive submission data must not leave the perimeter, is presented, organized around a data-residency constraint.
Abstract
Underwriters in commercial Property and Casualty (P&C) insurance spend 30 to 40% of their time on administrative work rather than risk judgment, and a single submission takes about 40 minutes by hand. We present Governing the Edge, a multi-agent framework for that layer, organized around a data-residency constraint: sensitive submission data must not leave the perimeter. Eleven agents and two deterministic control nodes, one a human-escalation interrupt, form a 13-node LangGraph workflow across two tiers. Agents touching raw submissions run locally on Gemma 2, each bound through a tool interface logging every invocation (synthetic stubs in the current prototype); only anonymized scores and non-identifying fields cross to Claude Sonnet in the cloud. Compliance rules are encoded as conditions on graph edges, so a non-compliant submission never reaches pricing. We walk through one full scenario end to end, a commercial auto submission whose principal driver carries serious violations, showing every agent call, every tool invocation, and the resulting routing decision. The framework processes a 40-minute manual submission in a few minutes on a single edge device, dominated by serialized on-device inference. On the hard-stop violation tier the framework enforces every rule correctly and reproducibly, since hard stops are deterministic predicates over fields extracted at temperature 0; overall compliance accuracy across the 20-scenario benchmark is 70%, with the remaining gap concentrated in softer, judgment-based tiers. It keeps a complete audit trail and respects the privacy boundary throughout. We release all code, compliance rules, tool stubs, and synthetic datasets.
FinDS-Agent is presented, a cloud–edge framework that keeps raw records and program execution at the trusted edge while providing a policy-screened, sanitized context to support cloud planning and support selective cloud planning while delimiting statistical, privacy, and transfer claims.
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