Jul 2026· Canadian Journal of Philosophy· pp. 1-20· 0 citations· 14 references
Abstract
According to the legal-grammatical picture of constitutivism, the constitutive standards of a kind x carry an existential threat: abiding by them is necessary for being an x at all. But this seems to leave no room for defective x’s—the bad-x problem. A functional model escapes this problem, yet it fits structural rational agency poorly. I argue that a suitably complex legal-grammatical model—one attentive to how legal enterprises are materially realized—makes room for genuinely internal violations: intelligible fouls, correctable from a dynamic kernel of perfect compliance. The existential threat survives, yet genuine defect finds a place within it.
Non-naturalists claim that normative properties are
sui generis
, attitude-independent, and irreducible to natural properties. A common objection is that although we shape our lives around normative properties, non-naturalism rules out any plausible explanation of how this is possible. Non-naturalism seems to imply that we are hopelessly alienated from the normative. Our goal here is to better understand this worry and use constitutivist resources to develop a novel response. The basic thought is that we are constituted—as deeply social agents—to be gripped by normative properties. So while our constitution does not ground normativity, it grounds our non-alienation from it.
Mikayla Kelley, Keshav Singh· Canadian Journal of Philosop...· 0 citations
Some interpreters hold that, for Aristotle, the pleasant is the primary
de dicto
goal of every vicious person. I argue that this is false and develop an alternative account of vicious motivation by self-interest (
to sumpheron
). In
Nicomachean Ethics
2.3, Aristotle claims that the vicious person errs with respect to the objects of choice: the pleasant, the
sumpheron
, and the fine. I argue that the vicious person can commit conceptual errors, ordering errors, and errors of omission in her pursuit of these objects. I develop this reading by providing an interpretation of Aristotle’s account of the
sumpheron
on which it is both a means and an end.
Sometimes, it may seem that an agent faces an obligation dilemma—a situation in which they cannot fulfill their obligations no matter what they do. However, there are at least three problems for any theory that embraces obligation dilemmas. The logical problem arises from a conflict between obligation dilemmas and venerable principles of deontic logic. The teleological problem arises from a conflict between obligation dilemmas and the compelling thought that an agent is obligated to do what would be best. And the practical problem arises from a conflict between believing that one faces an obligation dilemma and making a coherent choice. In this essay, I argue that these problems can be solved.
Aaron Thieme· Philosophy and Phenomenologi...· 0 citations
In this article, we consider several responses to Wittgenstein’s private language argument (
PLA
) beginning with A.J. Ayer’s “Robinson Crusoe” thought experiment from his 1954 symposium with Rush Rhees. While I’ll claim that Ayer’s response is unsound and doesn’t imperil a properly understood version of the
PLA
, it does point towards more enduring concerns. Even if private language is impossible, the
PLA
may not preclude the possibility of “solitary” speakers –isolated individuals who are the sole speakers of languages they develop, even though others could later learn these languages. I present an analysis of these problems as a trilemma for defenders of the
PLA
and offer a response that suggests some ways to defuse it.
Michael P. Wolf· Grazer Philosophische Studie...· 0 citations
Can animals reason? If so, what would their reasoning consist in, and how, if at all, would it differ from its human counterpart? On these questions, John Locke stakes out a position that also merits consideration today. I argue that, for Locke, reasoning is a matter of the subject's construing her mental states as support for a conclusion, where that conclusion can be a self‐directed imperative. Locke does not require that the subject represent the rules governing her inferences, nor that she use language or deploy abstract ideas. I argue that Locke's particularist, imagistic account is worth taking seriously in the contemporary debates over the nature of inference and animal reasoning.
Constitutivists say authoritative practical norms are grounded in the nature of action. But how are they so grounded? I argue that there is a deep, under-appreciated division among constitutivists on this point. “Transcendental” constitutivism says all rational agents are committed to practical norms on pain of inconsistency. “Functional” constitutivism says that complying with practical norms is necessary to realize the function of action. These views come apart, and the distinction between them has important implications for both how constitutivists should defend their view and how they should respond to the most popular objections to it: the “shmagency” and “bad action” problems.
Bennett Eckert‐Kuang· Canadian Journal of Philosop...· 0 citations
