To the knowledge, this represents the first open-source RISC-V processor that is both Linux-capable and specifically targeted at booting the Keystone framework, including adapting Keystone software to the authors' platform, while simultaneously addressing hardware-level faults.
TPM-Attest is presented, a hardware-rooted remote attestation framework that uses the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.0 and the Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) to prove, cryptographically, that a client booted cleanly and ran only authorised software -- without any kernel driver, without proprietary code...
Anudeep Gedela, A. Technology, Gitam University et al.· 0 citations
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide hardware-supported isolation through enclaves that protect code and data independently of software abstractions. However, TEEs alone cannot enforce information-flow security. This problem is further aggravated in LLVM-like low-level languages that allow unrestricted pointer...
Wesley B. Nuzzo, Samuel Dodson, Benjamin Houle et al.· 0 citations
Lattice is introduced, a novel RISC-V TEE framework that enables scalable enclaves on commercial RISC-V platforms with a minimal Trusted Computing Base (TCB) and proposes a non-intrusive Secure Monitor design for the underlying firmware.
Yu Zhao, Jia-Bei He, Ming-Ru Xu et al.· ACM Transactions on Architec...· 0 citations
This work presents DDRop, a new primitive that exploits the absence of cryptographic freshness to break the integrity of Intel TDX, Scalable SGX, and AMD SEV-SNP and demonstrates end-to-end attacks on an up-to-date TDX platform.
ETHZurich, Zúrich, Switzerland et al.· 0 citations
This work develops a formal framework for reasoning jointly about capability safety, speculative execution, and information-flow security, and presents SCHERI, a new processor design that formally proves that it provides end-to-end secure speculation guarantees for the constant-time policy.
Shi-Xin Song, Davide Davoli, Elias Storme et al.· 0 citations
This work presents a solution that allows the execution of unaltered AI models, compiled to WebAssembly, on the WebAssembly Micro Runtime (WAMR) in OP-TEE for Arm TrustZone, and provides an AI model distributor that encrypts the WebAssembly binary and places the encryption key in one of the device's fuses.
Friedrich Vandenberghe, Lachlan J. Gunn, B. Volckaert et al.· 0 citations
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