This study organizes security and economic requirements into 17 property families over six stages, with receipt soundness and completeness assessed separately, and introduces guarantee closure, a task-relative criterion for determining whether guarantees established at one stage remain available and constrain the later decisions that depend on them.
Abstract
Decentralized agent economies increasingly build a single task from protocols that were designed and secured separately. This creates a simple problem: a workflow can look correct at each step and still produce the wrong outcome. For example, a correct escrow may release payment on an authorized approval that provides little evidence that the delivered work actually satisfied the task. We systematize this problem across the full lifecycle of an agent task. Our study organizes security and economic requirements into 17 property families over six stages, with receipt soundness and completeness assessed separately. We examine 12 systems and standards, five reusable mechanism families, and four classical baselines. We introduce guarantee closure, a task-relative criterion for determining whether guarantees established at one stage remain available and constrain the later decisions that depend on them. We apply the criterion to controlled and native workflows, covering 840 matched executions and an exhaustive 11,648-case check over a finite objective-task domain. Our results expose recurring failures between verification and settlement, where conforming work can remain unaccepted or valid evidence can be ignored. Public records and model judgments further distinguish recorded approval from evidence of task conformance, while economic analysis identifies the report, penalty, and shared-error assumptions behind these guarantees. These findings show where end-to-end guarantees fail and what must be repaired to preserve them across the workflow.
Agent frameworks expose tools, delegation, memory and human approval, yet the controls attached to a request (identity, tenant, scopes, budgets, deadlines, rate limits, fail behavior) are routinely lost at execution boundaries: delegation, threads, streaming, resume, caching, retrieval and adapter exports. We present A...
Mukherjee Arghya· Indian Journal of Computer S...· 0 citations
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Multi-agent LLM systems place several agents on shared infrastructure, where each agent holds permissions far broader than the task it is delegated -- so every agent is routinely permitted to act on a peer's resources it was never assigned. We ask: under competitive pressure, what determines whether an agent crosses fr...
The introduction of Relic, which turns recurring collaboration failures into organization-owned, executable protocols, and how collaboration experience can become persistent organizational state that remains useful beyond the members who created it are shown.
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NostrAgent demonstrates an auditable prototype substrate for trustworthy agentic systems without centralized trust roots, and evaluates a Python prototype with a mixed-method design.
Oliver Aleksander Larsen, Mahyar Tourchi Moghaddam· arXiv.org· 0 citations
Enterprise AI agents can execute altered versions of approved actions, concurrently reuse the same permission, or retry operations whose responses were lost. These failures arise when approval and resource execution lack a shared contract. KedgeFlow specifies language-independent contracts for trusted controllers to au...