Controlled evidence-level and end-to-end comparisons show improved overall IoC recovery and attack-stage attribution over state-of-the-art provenance-based baselines over state-of-the-art provenance-based baselines in ANCHOR.
Abstract
Provenance-based intrusion detection systems (PIDSs) identify suspicious activity in audit streams, but their outputs remain difficult to turn into coherent attack narratives. Direct LLM analyses of local anomalous subgraphs lack deployment-specific normal-behavior knowledge and validated attack state across evidence fragments. This can cause unsupported attack interpretations of routine activities and incorrect attribution of temporally dispersed evidence to attack stages. We present ANCHOR, an investigation-oriented provenance system that combines evidence curation with context-grounded LLM reasoning. It calibrates anomaly judgments by relation type and links anomalous windows through rare relation-role patterns. The resulting evidence queues preserve causal structure, temporal boundaries, and cross-window continuity. The investigator interprets process-centered evidence using two complementary forms of context. Deployment Context combines environment-specific interaction and object baselines with high-risk security knowledge. Case Context uses a confidence-gated Attack-Tracking Cache to maintain investigation state across windows. Correlating current evidence with high-confidence prior findings, ANCHOR incrementally reconstructs attack narratives organized by kill-chain stages. We evaluate ANCHOR on six DARPA Transparent Computing E3/E5 datasets across three operating systems. Controlled evidence-level and end-to-end comparisons show improved overall IoC recovery and attack-stage attribution over state-of-the-art provenance-based baselines. These gains persist under a fixed LLM backbone in our evaluation. ANCHOR processes a full audit day at dollar-level API cost, supporting practical, context-grounded investigation across windows.
This work introduces persistent node evidence as an investigation-oriented representation boundary for provenance streams, and supports persistent node evidence as a bounded bridge from event prediction to precision-oriented offline investigation.
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Provenance-based intrusion detection systems (PIDS) often rely on anomaly detection to identify Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) activity. However, their alerts are commonly evaluated only by overlap with documented attack ground truth. As a result, all non-ground-truth alerts are treated as false positives, although s...
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Open-source vulnerability evidence is distributed across vulnerability databases, project advisories, version records, code repositories, issue/PR threads, proofs of concept, and tests. These artifacts may share upstream sources, apply to different scopes, or contain inconsistent conclusions, while security fixes may e...
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: Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are low-frequency, stealthy, and multi-stage attacks whose activities are embedded in massive volumes of benign host audit events, making both accurate detection and post-alert investigation challenging. Provenance graphs provide unified representations of interactions among process...
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