Sep 2026· International Symposium on Networks, Computers and Communications· pp. 1-6· 0 citations· 38 references
Abstract
Evaluating the effectiveness of multi-turn jailbreak attacks on large language models (LLMs) increasingly relies on automated evaluators, yet their reliability and agreement with human judgments in cybersecurity conversations have not been systematically examined. This paper presents a systematic human-machine agreement study of four automated evaluators, namely GPT-4.1, GPT-5.2, Llama Guard 3, and a rule-based classifier, using human annotations as the reference. Experiments are conducted on 762 unique adversarial dialogs per target model, Llama 2-7B and Qwen 2-7B, covering multi-turn settings, temporal prompt variations (present vs. past tense), and cybersecurity-related topics. Rather than treating classification performance alone as evidence of evaluator reliability, we distinguish inter-rater agreement from predictive performance by using Cohen's $\kappa$ as the primary agreement measure and F1-score as a complementary metric. Results show substantial agreement among human annotators, while human-machine agreement remains weak across multi-turn conditions, with $\kappa$ values below 0.36 regardless of conversation depth. Notably, GPT-based evaluators achieve moderately high F1-scores (0.42-0.72), despite their limited agreement with human judgments, demonstrating that conventional classification metrics can mask systematic evaluator disagreement. Past-tense prompt formulations further reduce human-machine agreement, decreasing $\kappa$ by 0.11-0.48 across turn depths. No evaluator achieves consistent agreement with human judgments $(\kappa \geq 0.40)$ across aggregated cybersecurity topics. These findings identify systematic limitations in current automated jailbreak evaluation and motivate evaluation protocols that combine agreement analysis, complementary performance metrics, contextual error analysis, and targeted human review for reliable multi-turn jailbreak benchmarking.
TypeSafe AI's Jev is a new kind of safety judge. It generates no text and no label: it answers questions the developer defines in advance and returns a probability for each answer. The vendor admits that adversarial input can change these answers but gives no numbers. In this paper, we present the first controlled adve...
Xiang Li, Ai-Chun Huang, Ming-Ming Zhang et al.· 0 citations
Expert evaluation of jailbreak responses is costly and difficult to scale, so the community increasingly relies on automated evaluators to determine whether an attack succeeds. However, jailbreak studies typically validate their chosen evaluator independently, repeatedly spending resources on similar evaluation efforts...
These findings show that gradient-based signals can support multi-turn jailbreak detection, but reliable deployment requires calibration on realistic benign conversations, short-window scoring, length-aware thresholds, and evaluation across attack types and model architectures.
Omar Sheta, Rinku Deuja, Hadi Masoudi et al.· 0 citations
Under the single-shot, raw-bytecode-only protocol, current LLMs are not reliable standalone forensic tools, and their robustness has not been systematically tested against contracts adversarially designed to mislead analysis.
Security evaluation of tool-using agents requires judging actions in context, yet generative judges add latency, explanation overhead, and output-validation failures. We study whether JEV, a typed decision model, offers a useful alternative for retrospective trace classification. We evaluate JEV and four generative jud...
Zhi-Qiang Wang, Yi-Chao Gao· 3 citations· ⚡1
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