A robust covariance-design framework is developed that jointly limits Eve decoding, maintains the transmitter's accuracy in estimating the Eves'directions and shifts the dominant passive-sensing response toward prescribed deceptive directions.
Abstract
This paper investigates the joint protection of confidential data and legitimate-user directional information in integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) networks. We consider a multiuser downlink in which passive multi-antenna eavesdroppers (Eves) attempt to decode confidential signals while exploiting legitimate-user reflections for unauthorized angular sensing. To address both threats, we develop a robust covariance-design framework that jointly limits Eve decoding, maintains the transmitter's accuracy in estimating the Eves'directions and shifts the dominant passive-sensing response toward prescribed deceptive directions. A Bayesian angular prior and the corresponding Bayesian Cramer-Rao bound (BCRB) characterize the transmitter's eavesdropper-angle estimation accuracy. Angular uncertainty is represented through geometry-consistent samples, such that each candidate Eve direction jointly determines the corresponding transmitter-Eve channel, user-Eve bearing, and deceptive direction. The resulting design balances worst-user secrecy, sensing accuracy, sensing privacy, and deception power. Robust Eve-decoding constraints are handled through finite sufficient conditions with intersample margins, while continuous ghost dominance is enforced using interval sum-of-squares (SOS) constraints. The resulting nonconvex problem is addressed through successive convex approximation (SCA) and semidefinite relaxation. Numerical results show that the proposed design effectively preserves secrecy and sensing privacy under Eve-angle uncertainty, provides controlled angular deception in single- and multiple-Eve scenarios, and outperforms benchmarks.
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