Jul 2026· Contemporary Pragmatism· pp. 1-15· 0 citations· 16 references
Abstract
Shusterman’s transformation of pragmatist philosophy of experience takes as its starting point the aesthetic quality of experience and the soma as the medium to the world. It therefore enables cooperation with phenomenology, hermeneutics, and philosophical anthropology. This transformation represents an integrative alternative to Rorty’s revival of old dualisms (private/public, body/linguistic mind). Dewey’s public inquiry can be regarded as the pragmatist model for a democratic interpenetration of modern divisions in the digital postmodernity (Lyotard), which is not identical with postmodernism. Such interpenetration integrates laypeople and experts to solve problems arising from indirect consequences for third parties who did not cause these consequences. Depending on the problem, participants are needed from regional and global, as well as lifeworld and functional forms of community. Somaesthetics holds the potential to open aesthetically and somatically up the habitus of separate roles for public interpenetration.
This article examines the conceptual affinities between American Pragmatism and European post-structuralist thought through a comparative reading of Charles S. Peirce, Michel Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze. It argues that Peirce’s “ultra-Copernican revolution” redefines philosophical inquiry by shifting attention from the essence of concepts to their practical effects. Meaning is thus understood in terms of consequences, as a possible difference in practice. From this perspective, Deleuze’s question what can a body do? and Foucault’s analyses of power and the practices of the self are interpreted pragmatically: truth and meaning are not fixed entities but effects produced within habits, understood as socially embedded dispositions to act. Foucault’s ethopoietics becomes a practice of deliberate self-formation oriented toward effective conduct. The article concludes by exploring the political dimension of Peirce’s realism and his doctrine of “Evolutionary Love,” emphasizing continuity and communal aspiration, and aligning pragmatism with a geophilosophy grounded in hope, trust, and democratic community.
R. Fabbrichesi· Estudios de Filosofía· 0 citations
The subject of this research is a comprehensive existential-semiotic deconstruction of the sovereign identity and ontological being of the popular character Ume in Koyoharu Gotouge's Japanese graphic novel "Demon Slayer". The author thoroughly examines such critical aspects as the specific century-long existence of the literary heroine within the specialized space of high sociocultural density and her subsequent attainment of absolute sovereign autonomy contrary to the explicit pragmatic intent of the work's author. Special attention is paid to the systematic analysis of the fictional character's unique existential experience, the process of forming her free choice within the metaphysical space of Limbo, and her functioning as an emancipated conceptual subject of contemporary mass culture. The methodological framework of the study relies on an operational synergy of Jacques Lacan’s structural psychoanalysis and John Austin’s speech act theory. This analytical instrumentation is integrated into the context of Umberto Eco’s semiotics, G.W.F. Hegel’s dialectics, Gilles Deleuze’s conceptual character philosophy, and Nikolai Berdyaev’s metaphysics of freedom. The scientific novelty lies in the fact that the excessive historical context of Yoshiwara during the Kasei, Meiji, and Taisho eras is conceptualized for the first time as a hyper-dense substrate determining the structural autonomy of a character. The original theoretical construct of the "Century-Old Observer" is proposed here. The main conclusions reveal a profound metatextual error of the work's demiurge through the prism of Hegel's "cunning of reason" and prove the heroine's transformation into a metaphysical being — Shiraume. This phenomenon turns Ume into the epicenter of an existential catastrophe, initiating text destruction within Eco's semiotic paradigm.
Viktor Pavlovich Kazantsev· Философия и культура· 0 citations
This article examines Paul’s speech at the Areopagus (Acts 17:16-34) as a theologically grounded confrontation between the Gospel and Hellenistic conceptions of the good life. By analysing the concept of eudaimonia in Epicurean and Stoic philosophy, the study contends that Paul neither rejects nor assimilates the ancient pursuit of human flourishing. Instead, he reorients it by placing the question of a fulfilled life within an eschatological framework shaped by God’s salvific action. Through the call to repentance, the proclamation of judgment, and the announcement of resurrection, human fulfilment is redefined in terms of soteria rather than ethical or rational self-sufficiency. Considered within Luke’s narrative framework and in dialogue with authentic Pauline letters, the Areopagus speech reveals an early Christian reconfiguration of human flourishing grounded in the Gospel.
This article presents a theoretical and conceptual analysis of self-deconstruction in contemporary contemplative and clinical practices. It argues that psychological suffering is not primarily related to the existence of the self as such, but to its ontological and linguistic reification as a fixed identity, corresponding to idem-identity and to what Heidegger described as an ontology of presence (Vorhandenheit). Drawing on hermeneutic phenomenology, the self is reconceptualized as ipseity (selfhood): a relational, temporal, and performative mode of being-in-the-world. From this perspective, self-deconstruction does not imply the elimination of identity but a transformation in the mode of being of the self. This framework integrates three axes: (a) Heidegger's analytics of being-in-the-world and the distinction between sameness and ipseity; (b) a pragmatic distinction between indirect and direct reference in language, allowing experiential and clinical transformation without representational reductionism; and (c) a dialogue with nondual contemplative traditions and contemporary clinical approaches, particularly mindfulness-based and third-wave therapies. The article proposes a translational architecture linking ontological analysis, phenomenology of language, and clinical practice, and shows how non-duality can be understood in a non-nihilistic way when grounded in an ontology of ipseity. Clinical implications for psychotherapy, mindfulness-based interventions, and models of self-related suffering are discussed, including connections to Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, cognitive defusion, and decentering, as well as boundary conditions and safeguards for contemplative practices.
Roberto Aristegui Lagos, Javier García-Campayo, Paulina Lamas-Morales· Actas espanolas de psiquiatr...· 0 citations
ABSTRACT:This essay offers a comparative analysis of Richard Rorty's and Günther Anders' respective accounts of self-contingency, focusing on how each thinker links contingency with freedom and the consequences this has for the concept of the self. While Rorty, from a pragmatic standpoint, frames contingency as a source of strength and self-creation—as seen in his notions of the "strong poet" and "liberal ironist"—Anders, drawing from phenomenological and existential traditions, depicts it as a burden that contributes to powerlessness and existential disorientation. The analysis draws on Rorty's Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity and his lecture Hope in Place of Knowledge, contrasting them with Anders' early philosophical anthropology in The Unworldliness of Man. The focus also lies on certain aspects that – according to Rorty – stand for each of the two traditions. This is in order to identify possible reasons how the linking of the same concepts can lead to such differing outcomes. By re-evaluating Anders' work through a pragmatic lens, this essay suggests that there is a possibility of a more hopeful and action-oriented reading of his philosophy.
Daria-Leona Mac Award· Philosophical Topics· 0 citations
In The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), Hannah Arendt reimagines the relationship between aesthetics and politics. Rather than treating them as two adjacent fields, she situates aesthetic perception before ideological thinking. If totalitarian movements are distinguished by their disdain for sensual reality, as Arendt argues, resistance must begin by rehabilitating the aesthetic sensibilities that ground ethical judgment and political action. In recent years, Arendt has been widely invoked as a prophet of the present, making The Origins of Totalitarianism a surprise bestseller. But the book ends with only a side glance toward the future, leaving the reader with a devastating diagnosis and no treatment plan. This article draws on Arendt’s conception of aesthesis as embodied perception to reassess how two of her contemporaries, Emmanuel Levinas and Vladimir Nabokov, sought to redefine the roles of philosophy and art in a culture dominated by ideology.
Patrick Eichholz· American Literature· 0 citations