Computational Bounds for $f$-Routing

Abstract

The $f$-routing protocol is a leading candidate for quantum position verification (Kent, Munro, and Spiller, 2011), but security guarantees for explicit functions remain limited. We prove unconditional resource lower bounds for uniform attackers; our new techniques bypass communication-complexity bounds central to previous works, which are inherently at most linear in the input length. We show that, for input length $n$ and sufficiently small constant $\epsilon>0$, a uniformly generated strategy using $q$ qubits and having description length $\mathrm{poly}(q)$, with success probability at least $1-\epsilon$ on every input, implies the following computational bounds on $f$: 1. If the strategies are arbitrary quantum channels, then $f\in\mathrm{QSZK}(\mathrm{poly}(nq))$, where $\mathrm{QSZK}(T)$ is the class of languages having quantum statistical zero knowledge proofs in which the verifier runs in time $T$ (and the simulator in time $\mathrm{poly}(T)$). 2. If the strategies are explicit Pauli-sparse unitaries on $q$ qubits that have at most $s$ nonzero Pauli coefficients, then $f\in\mathrm{DTIME}(\mathrm{poly}(nqs))$. 3. If the strategies are Clifford+T circuits using at most $t$ magic gates, then $f\in\mathrm{DTIME}(\mathrm{poly}(nq2^t))$. Time and space hierarchies then yield explicit functions secure against polynomial and even quasipolynomial qubits $q$ under our computational restrictions. These bounds exceed the $q\le\log n$ bound of Bluhm, Christandl, and Speelman (2022) for inner product function $f=\mathrm{IP}$, at the cost of restricting adversarial computation and increasing honest evaluation complexity.