Governing trade uncertainty amid WTO weakening: coordination and firm-level adaptation

Abstract

The weakening of the WTO's framework for trade conflict management, together with more unilateral measures and diverging national rules, creates distinct but related forms of uncertainty for governments and firms. The authors treat WTO weakness as part of a broader fragmentation of trade authority—not as the cause of every problem discussed. The main distinction is between two kinds of predictability. First-order predictability covers information and accommodation in the public regulatory environment. Second-order predictability covers how an affected firm responds. Using doctrinal analysis and structured comparison, two regulatory episodes are looked at—the Section 301 and Section 232 conflicts—and three firm-level commercial settings: Huawei-related export controls, Apple's tariff-driven supply-chain adjustment, and RTI Ltd v MUR Shipping BV. This comparison shows that mechanisms only improve predictability when the relevant actor has legal authority or practical control. Coordination can deliver better information or negotiated accommodation, but it cannot settle questions of international legality. Firms can make their own responses more predictable through compliance systems, lawful operational alternatives, and clear contractual terms. But they cannot create public-law permission where none exists. Trade governance is thus functionally differentiated and overlapping: public coordination and private ordering may address different aspects of the same disruption, but neither can replace authority it does not have.