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Psychological Determinants of Academic Integrity in the Use of Generative AI in Higher Education
It is concluded that effective responses to GenAI-related integrity problems should combine policy clarity, pedagogy, AI literacy, and student support rather than relying only on prohibition or software-based surveillance.
COGNITIVE, SOCIAL AND PROCEDURAL VECTORS OF CRITICAL THINKING: FROM THEORY TO EDUCATIONAL IMPERATIVES
This study investigates the primary conceptualizations of critical thinking, synthesizing contemporary insights from Ukrainian philosophical and specialized literature. The author introduces a tripartite framework to categorize critical thinking into cognitive, social, and procedural vectors. The analysis demonstrates that higher-order cognitive skills are vital not only for academic advancement but also for bolstering civic engagement and professional efficacy. Rather than framing critical thinking as a series of reactive, isolated decisions, this paper posits it as a disciplined adherence to cognitive protocols where individual actions align with broader behavioral rationality. Consequently, the ultimate objective shifts from a merely accurate reaction to the proactive design of independent behavioral strategies. This procedural approach empowers individuals to actively influence and direct societal outcomes. Crucially, within the context of modern information warfare, critical thinking serves as an indispensable defense mechanism safeguarding human consciousness against media manipulation. Ultimately, the author frames critical thinking as a mode of rational self-reflection that allows individuals to monitor their own cognitive processes, appreciate diverse perspectives, and execute autonomous, well-calibrated choices based on systematic situational assessments. This reality charges the philosophy of education with an urgent mandate: to systematically explore and construct the pedagogical environments necessary for the successful cultivation of critical thinking.
The Illusion of Understanding: Generative AI, Epistemic Humility, and the Erosion of Intellectual Character
It is argued that intelligence should be assessed not by output quality or efficiency alone, but by its impact on intellectual character, arguing that intelligence should be assessed not by output quality or efficiency alone, but by its impact on intellectual character.
Is Religion an Epistemic Ally or Competitor to Science? A Critical Reassessment
This paper critically reassesses the epistemic relationship between religion and science, examining whether they function as competitors, allies, or differentiated yet complementary domains of inquiry. It situates the discussion historically, demonstrating that episodes of tension often reflect disputes over authority rather than evidence alone. The analysis distinguishes methodological constraint from ontological assertion, showing that reductionist claims—whether scientistic or theological—overextend their warrant and obscure the distinct roles of moral reasoning, metaphysical reflection, and existential interpretation. Science is shown to govern empirical explanation through methodological naturalism, testability, and predictive reliability, while religion advances cognitive, normative, and existential claims that resist exhaustive empirical verification but remain subject to rational assessment. The paper critiques reductionism on three fronts: internal coherence, normativity, and the limits of third person explanation in consciousness studies, revealing persistent gaps in scientistic exclusivism. In response, it develops a calibrated complementary model grounded in epistemic autonomy, conditional intersection, and regulated convergence. The model reframes apparent conflict as domain misalignment rather than intrinsic opposition, preserving methodological integrity while enabling principled interaction. Implications for public reason, education, and policy formation are considered, emphasizing the disciplined coexistence of plural epistemic authorities. By clarifying the boundaries, intersections, and mutual constraints of science and religion, the paper contributes a context-sensitive framework for navigating contemporary intellectual, moral, and metaphysical challenges without collapsing inquiry into a single method or insulating domains from engagement. (226 words)
Incoherent by Design? On the Moral Self-Consistency of LLMs
It is argued that demonstrating internal incoherence is a necessary precursor to AI alignment as well as a broader phenomenon of epistemic instability in generative AI wherein models fail to reliably maintain coherence with respect to their own prior outputs.
Beyond the Binaries: Techno-Optimism and Pessimism as Situated Epistemic-Affective Orientations
Contemporary debates on technological futures are marked by disputes over epistemic authority and normative legitimacy—over what counts as responsible anticipation, relevant knowledge, or legitimate critique. This article shifts analytical attention to the epistemic–affective orientations through which technological hope and critique acquire normative force in such debates, shaping how uncertainty is framed and how responses to technological change come to appear credible, excessive, or irresponsible. In doing so, it reveals how science-based expertise legitimizes certain paths forward while marginalizing others. The article conceptualizes these patterned assumptions as asymmetrically structured forms of techno-optimism and techno-pessimism: socially distributed epistemic–affective orientations through which affirmative and critical relations to technological futures are articulated. To account for their persistence and internal diversity, the article situates contemporary techno-orientations within enduring Enlightenment and Romantic repertoires, treated as overlapping and selectively mobilized cultural traditions rather than fixed worldviews. On this basis, the article develops a fourfold typology distinguishing Enlightenment and Romantic variants of both techno-optimism and techno-pessimism. The typology functions as a diagnostic lens for examining how different forms of technological hope and critique acquire epistemic authority and normative legitimacy across scientific, policy, and innovation contexts. By clarifying the epistemic and affective grammars through which technological futures are evaluated, the article contributes to broader debates on the authority, legitimacy, and contestability of science-based futures, and supports more reflexive engagements with technological hope and skepticism attentive to how reason and affect jointly shape what futures become thinkable, governable, and desirable.