rApp/xApp Attestation: A New Security Use Case for O-RAN

Abstract

The disaggregation and softwarization introduced by the Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) architecture enable multi-vendor innovation but also expose the RAN Intelligent Controller (RIC) ecosystem to new runtime security risks. Existing O-RAN specifications define strong safeguards for onboarding, authentication, identity management, and secure communication; however, they do not provide a concrete mechanism for verifying whether deployed rApps and xApps remain in their intended, untampered state during operation. This paper introduces rApp/xApp attestation as a RIC-native O-RAN security use case for runtime integrity verification. Rather than proposing a new cryptographic protocol, the work defines how existing integrity verification techniques can be integrated into O-RAN through attestation modules, attestation agents, RIC application interfaces, and SMO-driven policy coordination. We map the use case to relevant O-RAN Alliance working groups, identify required standardization extensions, and demonstrate feasibility through a lightweight hash-based prototype implemented on the Near-RT RIC platform. Experimental results show attestation latencies below 40 ms across multiple cryptographic hash functions, indicating that runtime attestation can be performed without disrupting time-sensitive RIC operations when appropriately scheduled. Finally, we discuss remaining technical and standardization challenges, including trusted verification, known-good runtime states, scalability, mitigation policies, and future hybrid attestation mechanisms.