Together, these findings connect detector comparisons to the test population, preprocessing state, visible information, and measured pipeline stages, and identify the protocol fields needed alongside a score to support interpretable comparisons of log anomaly detection accuracy and resource use.
Abstract
Protocol choices can change the conclusions drawn from log anomaly detection benchmarks even when detector settings are fixed. We present a joint empirical study of split construction, representation visibility, and component costs using six fixed count, sequence, and semantic configurations on Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) and Blue Gene/L (BGL) logs. Random splits place several configurations near the average-precision ceiling, whereas group-disjoint HDFS and chronological BGL evaluation produce lower scores and different observed orderings. At a fixed BGL cutoff, parser choice spans 0.124 in semantic XGBoost mean average precision while preserving its lead over count XGBoost; the earliest rolling period reverses that ordering. A two-factor cross-system ablation contrasts source-only representations with offline transductive access to unlabeled target templates through the representation corpus and inverse document frequency: HDFS-to-BGL mean average precision moves from 0.191 with source-only access to 0.325 with union-corpus, target-IDF access, and the intermediate conditions reveal direction-dependent interactions in average precision and retrieval at fixed review budgets. Component-level profiling separates parsing and representation costs from classifier training, prediction, and storage. Together, these findings connect detector comparisons to the test population, preprocessing state, visible information, and measured pipeline stages, and identify the protocol fields needed alongside a score to support interpretable comparisons of log anomaly detection accuracy and resource use.
System log anomaly detection (LogAD) requires balancing detection quality, interpretability, and deployment efficiency. While deep learning approaches achieve strong performance, they often rely on large labeled datasets and lack transparency. Recent large language model (LLM)-based methods improve reasoning but introd...
Reproducing a provenance-based intrusion detector's score does not establish what that score says about its emitted alarms or the information its encoder uses. We audit nine released implementations, execute four detectors using their own code, and isolate three measurement effects. First, a fixed-alert comparison sepa...
Jih-Wan Moon, Gunhee Kim, Myeongjang Pyeon· 0 citations
Large AI models increasingly rely on distributed GPU execution, yet it remains unclear whether established anomaly detection methods transfer effectively to this setting. We introduce GF-Bench, a PyTorch-based framework and dataset for generating controlled failures in distributed GPU workloads. The framework supports...
Bo-Yuan Cui, Yu-Yang Zeng, Yi-Fang Tian et al.· Proceedings of the 1st Inter...· 0 citations
LLM routers pick a cheap or expensive model per request by its content, and many gateways and some cloud platforms can log that choice with content logging off. We measure this privacy channel beyond token counts, accounting for noisy labels and repeated prompts. We run pre-registered studies on 1.7 million real reques...
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) over vulnerability databases is widely expected to improve LLM-based vulnerability detection. We report a pre-specified evaluation in which it does not, and derive from it an evaluation protocol. On a near-balanced benchmark of 100 Python 3.12 snippets, raw CVE/CWE retrieval never m...
Patrick Deininger, S. Rappl, Helmut Lindner et al.· Journal of Cybersecurity and...· 0 citations
Machine-learning intrusion detectors reach high average accuracy yet fail consistently on a small set of flows near the decision boundary, where benign and attack traffic overlap in feature space. These errors matter operationally, and standard remedies stop short: adversarial training adds perturbations whose gradient...
Ze-Ru Wang, T. E. Nyamasvisva· Advances in Engineering Inno...· 0 citations
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