This work proposes the first verifiable batch-level RLA scheme, which shifts the trust anchor from the EA directly to the voter and operates on groups of ballots (batches) to eliminate individual tracking hurdles and transforms a national-scale election into many smaller self-tallying elections: one for each batch.
Audit graphs are presented as a solution to design the assertions needed for RLAs of arbitrary STV elections, as well as quantitatively describe the uncertainty (or lack thereof) of their outcomes.
In a deliberative poll, once submissions outnumber what anyone will read, some mechanism chooses which arguments each voter sees, acquiring much of the decision; practice delegates it to opaque learned rankers, so a voter cannot recompute or contest the exposure that shaped their vote. We ask whether it can be a publis...
Muntaser M Syed, M. Zanker, Marius Silaghi· 0 citations
Preferential voting allows participants to rank multiple alternatives according to their preferences rather than being restricted to selecting a single option. Such mechanisms are used in national and local elections and, in decentralized governance, can be applied to committee selection, the prioritization of protocol...
L. Kovalchuk, Andrii Nastenko, O. Bespalov et al.· Algorithms· 0 citations
These measurements turn correlation from a post-hoc warning into an auditable allocation decision and turn correlation from a post-hoc warning into an auditable allocation decision.
Miao-Bo Hu, Shu-Hao Hu, Xiao-Bo Guo et al.· 0 citations
In this work, we show how two adversaries (Eve and Mallory) can coordinate an electromagnetic side-channel attack to recon- struct the vote displayed on an e-voting machine (EVM) and link it to a specific voter (Alice). Assuming that Eve has access to a place adjacent to the e-polling room (e.g., restroom, unsupervised...
Leandro Hyeda, K. Cardoso, Antonio Oliveira-Jr et al.· 0 citations
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