Sep 2026· Journal of the American Philosophical Association· pp. 1-18· 0 citations· 31 references
Abstract
Although much ink has been spilled in discussing the relationship between rationality and normative reasons on the one hand and normative reasons and reasoning on the other, surprisingly little has been said about whether we can understand rationality in terms of reasoning. I propose a novel way to understand structural rationality in terms of good reasoning. I argue that structural rationality is best understood in terms of adherence to what I label indefeasible good reasoning. I then offer the beginnings of a theory of substantive rationality in terms of defeasible reasoning. I show how this can provide a unified account of structural and substantive dimensions of rationality, and show that my view also gives the right verdict in some challenging cases for other prominent theories.
The purpose of this article is to explore a possible answer to the following question: In what sense can we say that instrumental reasoning is normative? Instrumental reasoning is understood here as a rational requirement, one that guides us in forming intentions toward the necessary means to ends that are already inte...
Matheus de Lima Rui· Filosofia Unisinos· 1 citation
As Gascón (2015) notes, the capacity to evaluate arguments—understood in the abstract, propositional sense—has been “the first matter of concern” in virtue argumentation theory. Recent exchanges, including Aberdein’s (2023) response to Siegel (2023), show the debate continues. This paper offers a more comprehensive rev...
The book presents a novel, abductivist theory of knowledge and argues for it over its two main rivals: safety theory and causal explanationism. According to abductivism, a belief constitutes knowledge when, given the way it is formed or maintained, the best explanation of its being true rather than false lies in the...
A significant proportion of human reasoning is systematically biased, a fact that sits uneasily with argumentation theory’s methodological commitment to the principle of charity. Traditionally, the principle requires arguments to be reconstructed as plausibly and rationally as possible, which conflicts with the defin...
Nastasia Mueller, David Löwenstein, G. Vosgerau· Argumentation: an internatio...· 0 citations
This article is concerned with the question:
What makes it rational to believe a mathematical statement?
It focuses in particular on philosophical questions concerning rationally believing set theoretic axioms. A distinction is drawn between having mathematical warrant and having philosophical warrant for believi...
L. Horsten· Journal of Philosophical Log...· 0 citations
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