HPCC is presented, the first low-latency 3-input multiplication gadget for arbitrary fields that maintains a constant latency of one cycle, independent of the number of shares, and is leveraged to implement the first composable AES S-Box with two cycles of latency with an arbitrary number of shares.
Abstract
Cryptographic hardware implementations often leak secret information through side channels. This can allow attackers to learn secret data, such as a cryptographic key, without any vulnerability in the cryptographic algorithm itself. A popular countermeasure to such attacks is masking, which ensures that processed data is independent of the secrets by splitting them into multiple independent shares, often at the cost of significant overhead in terms of required area, latency, and randomness. The composable PINI notion in the glitch-extended probing model ensures some degree of security against such side-channel analysis attacks, and guarantees that the circuit may be arbitrarily composed with other PINI circuits while maintaining the same security level. This allows for the secure implementation of arbitrary circuits using trivial composition, replacing elementary gates with “gadgets” realizing the same functionality in a PINI-secure manner. Up to now, PINI gadgets at arbitrary security order are limited to quadratic functions, i.e., 2-input gates, with the best known as HPC3.X realizing a 2-input multiplier in one clock cycle.In this work, we present HPCC, the first low-latency 3-input multiplication gadget for arbitrary fields that maintains a constant latency of one cycle, independent of the number of shares. HPCC additionally allows for the computation of any number of multiplications in a single cycle with relatively little overhead when two of the three operands are identical. When instantiated with two shares and for F2, HPCC halves the previous record for lowest number of fresh masks required at comparable area cost. With more shares, HPCC is the only single-cycle gadget realizing 3- input multiplications in arbitrary fields. We leverage HPCC to implement the first composable AES S-Box with two cycles of latency with an arbitrary number of shares. This S-Box design significantly outperforms the previous record in terms of area and randomness when instantiated with three shares and stands as the only two-cycle solution for more shares.
This work focuses on detecting (low-level) vulnerabilities in masked FPGA designs through experimental and tool-assisted evaluation and shows how to formally abstract, unveil, and mitigate such leakages, thereby enabling a security-aware FPGA design flow that spans from the behavioral to the physical level.
Nicolai Müller, Daniel Lammers, Simon Osterheider et al.· IACR Transactions on Cryptog...· 0 citations
This work focuses on detecting (low-level) vulnerabilities in masked FPGA designs through experimental and tool-assisted evaluation and shows how to formally abstract, unveil, and mitigate such leakages, thereby enabling a security-aware FPGA design flow that spans from the behavioral to the physical level.
Nicolai Müller, Daniel Lammers, Simon Osterheider et al.· IACR Cryptology ePrint Archi...· 0 citations
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