DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS AND FAST CONVERGENCE IN THE ASSIGNMENT GAME

COMMENT ON “ASYNCHRONOUS CHOICE IN REPEATED COORDINATION GAMES” BY

Delegate Pricing to Algorithms: When Slow and Steady Wins the Race

We study the strategic design of learning algorithms in a canonical continuous-time pricing game. We introduce a meta-game in which firms select learning rates for a gradient dynamic, evaluating payoffs as the discounted sum of profits accrued along the entire learning path. We uncover a fundamental dichotomy driven by...

PIER Working Paper 11-021

An evolutionary game model of market strategy mutation under sanctions pressure

Prolonged sanctions pressure is changing the behavior of companies and entrepreneurs. But existing models do not explain well how exactly they adapt: some ignore that firms act differently, others assume that the market is frozen in place, even though real data from 2022–2024 show a rapid shift in strategies — from wor...

Bargaining and Investment ∗

Research on the Game Dynamics of Optional Public Goods

The main findings demonstrate that individuals update strategies primarily through self-adjustment based on historical payoffs, with imitation playing merely an auxiliary role and the optimal self-adjustment proportion is approximately 0.9, and low sensitivity coefficients and mutation rates favor the emergence of coop...