More Patients or Healthier Populations? Institutionalised Conflict of Interest, Health System Governance, and Population Health
Abstract
Conflict of interest (CoI) in health systems is commonly viewed as an individual ethical issue but may also become institutionalised when governance arrangements align policy-making authority with professional or financial self-interest. Using Iran as an illustrative case, this article examines how institutionalised CoI can gradually shape policy priorities and distort health system missions towards provider-centred rather than population-centred goals, often without deliberate intent. A comparative analysis of health ministers’ professional backgrounds suggests substantial variation across countries in governance arrangements and leadership models. The article discusses how institutionalised CoI may contribute to policy distortions including persistent reliance on fee-for-service (FFS) payment, weakened gatekeeping, dual practice, and inadequate transparency, ultimately affecting healthcare utilisation, financial protection, and health system performance. Addressing these challenges requires governance reforms that strengthen leadership, align provider incentives with population health, and improve transparency, accountability, and institutional independence.