Germany’s Policy in the Middle East Regarding Peace and Security: Achievements and Miscalculations

Abstract

Introduction. In the early 2020s, the strategic presence of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Global South entered a phase of systemic crisis. In an attempt to reverse this trend, offi cial Berlin intensifi ed the use of political and military instruments in the Middle East, framing their deployment as a contribution to regional peace and stability. This article aims to assess the content and eff ectiveness of Germany's political and military measures, as well as their actual impact on confl ict resolution and the regional balance of power.Materials and Methods. The empirical basis of the study draws on documents from the Office of the Federal Chancellor, the Bundestag, the Federal Foreign Office, and the Federal Ministry of Defence for the period 2006–2026. The research combines comparative analysis, event analysis, and discourse analysis, allowing for a systematic examination of the evolution of German foreign policy rhetoric, the dynamics of high-level official visits, and the patterns of Bundeswehr military presence in the region.Results. Within the framework of the course toward “strategic restraint”, Germany formed a positive foreign policy image: in 2003, it refused to support the invasion of Iraq; subsequent efforts to strengthen its positions (including participation in security sector reform and the fi ght against ISIS) demonstrated limited effectiveness. On the Palestinian issue and the Lebanese settlement, Berlin declared its commitment to the “two states for two peoples” formula and to the territorial integrity of Lebanon. However, the unconditional priorities remained consideration of Israel's interests and the special nature of relations with it. After October 7, 2023, the FRG expressed political solidarity with Israel in its confrontation with Hamas and the Iran-backed “axis of resistance”. In 2025–2026, Berlin shifted to an open course of containing Iran. At the same time, Germany consistently avoided direct military involvement and took into account the positions of the Gulf monarchies.Conclusion. Germany's demonstrated caution in the use of force served not so much as a manifestation of balance as a cover for its limited influence and piecemeal military presence in the region. The low effectiveness of the FRG's participation in conflict resolution is explained by a shift in goals. Berlin's main task is not conflict resolution, but the containment of actors rejecting the Western-centric model of world order. The article is addressed to specialists in the fi eld of international security and researchers of relationsbetween the Global North and the Global South.