It is shown that when both market prices and trader valuations are chosen adversarially, sublinear regret is impossible even under full feedback, thereby motivating the stochastic assumption on the valuations.
Abstract
We study online learning in market making, where, at each round, a market maker posts bid and ask prices before observing the market price and the private valuation of an incoming trader. In this setting, Maran et al. 2026 introduce a feedback model motivated by limit order books, in which the trader's valuation is revealed only if no transaction occurs. Assuming that trader valuations are drawn i.i.d. from an unknown distribution while market prices are chosen adversarially, they establish an expected regret bound of $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3})$. In this work, we improve upon this guarantee by establishing a high-probability regret bound of $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T})$. As a warm-up, we first consider the full-feedback setting. We introduce a discretization of the bid-ask space based on two coupled grids and combine it with Hedge to achieve the desired regret rate. Building on these ideas, we then address the substantially weaker feedback induced by a limit order book and develop an algorithm that achieves the same guarantee. Finally, we investigate the limits of learnability in fully adversarial environments, where the valuations may vary arbitrarily as well. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that when both market prices and trader valuations are chosen adversarially, sublinear regret is impossible even under full feedback, thereby motivating our stochastic assumption on the valuations.
Market makers keep trading efficient by setting bid and ask prices for buyers and sellers. In sequential market making, trades happen independently based on price thresholds, requiring the market maker to maintain balanced, low-risk inventory over T rounds. This paper studies how to maximize revenue with unknown buyer...
Davide Maran, Marcello Restelli, F. Stradi· 0 citations
We study online profit maximization in multilateral trade, a setting that generalizes both dynamic pricing and bilateral trade. At each round, an intermediary posts prices to buyers and offers payments to sellers; trade occurs only if every agent accepts. We consider valuations drawn from an unknown joint distribution,...
Francesco Bacchiocchi, Matteo Castiglioni, Anna Lunghi et al.· 0 citations
We study an online trading problem where a trader, given a sequence of i.i.d. prices drawn from a known distribution $F$ on $[0,1]$, must make irrevocable buy, sell, or hold decisions subject to storage constraints. We investigate achievable algorithmic performance measured in terms of regret, the difference between th...
Jerry Anunrojwong, Akshit Kumar, Rachitesh Kumar· 0 citations
Threshold-UCB is developed, which improves the expected regret to $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3})$ and reuses sales observations across inventory levels through shared estimates of demand-tail probabilities, allowing the same data to support revenue upper bounds for multiple inventories rather than a single inventory...
For the fundamental problem of prediction from expert advice, Freund asked whether one could compete with a comparator that switches $k$ times among only $m$ experts. For a discrete set of experts, this problem was resolved by Bousquet and Warmuth (2020), who gave an efficient algorithm with optimal regret matching the...
Assistant Professor Benjamin Lindquist studies how engineers deliberately injected randomness into early AI, giving rise to deep-learning models that sometimes hallucinate.