Coordinated Defense Against Cyber-Physical Attacks in Power System Restoration

Abstract

In recent years, geopolitical conflicts have dramatically increased the likelihood of major blackouts triggered by deliberate attacks. During power system restoration (PSR), sustained deliberate attacks can further target the vulnerable restored systems, exacerbating power outage losses. It is of great significance to enhance the defense capability of the restored systems under deliberate attack scenarios. To this end, this paper proposes a decision-making method for enhancing the resilience of PSR under the risk of cyber-physical coordinated attacks. First, the risk caused by deliberate attacks on restoration components during PSR is analyzed. From the aspects of topology and system operation, indicators such as restored network connectivity, scale-free property, outward expansion capability, and loading rate balance are extracted to reflect the attack risk level of the restored systems. Next, based on the measurement characteristics of PMUs, the observability constraints of sequential PSR schemes are established. The observability redundancy indicator is introduced to enhance the resilience of restored cyber systems against attacks. Then, a sequential PSR model considering the above cyber-physical defense indicators is established, the deloading characteristics of wind farms (WFs) and energy storage stations (ESSs) for frequency response are modeled, and a rolling solution framework adaptable to attack scenarios is designed. Finally, the objective function and constraints of the PSR model are transformed by weight coefficient selection and big-M method. The New England 39-bus system and an actual system case validate the effectiveness of the proposed method for significantly enhancing cyber-physical coordinated defense capability while ensuring restoration benefits during PSR.