FragToken is proposed, a training-time framework that combines source-model self-distillation, capacity-aware filtering and budgeting, and BPE-Aligned Merging to induce fragmented generation under ordinary prompts while largely preserving model utility.
Abstract
As large language model (LLM) inference becomes increasingly expensive, resource-consumption attacks pose a growing threat to model providers. Existing attacks typically amplify cost by inducing abnormally long or repetitive outputs on attacker-controlled or triggered requests, making them easier to detect and limiting their deployment-wide impact when benign traffic dominates. In this work, we uncover a previously overlooked token-level attack surface arising from the many-to-one mapping from token sequences to decoded text. Although standard LLMs predominantly generate the canonical token sequences induced by their tokenizers, the same text can also be represented by substantially longer non-canonical sequences. This representational flexibility exposes a new avenue for resource-consumption attacks: an attacker can train the model to favor such sequences, systematically increasing the number of autoregressive decoding steps without a proportional increase in visible response length. However, we empirically find that directly maximizing token fragmentation substantially degrades model utility, producing conspicuous answer-quality failures that undermine attack stealthiness. To address this challenge, we propose FragToken, a training-time framework that combines source-model self-distillation, capacity-aware filtering and budgeting, and BPE-Aligned Merging to induce fragmented generation under ordinary prompts while largely preserving model utility. We evaluate FragToken on four LLMs across three benchmarks. Across the four models, FragToken achieves a three-benchmark average token inflation ratio (TIR) ranging from 1.99 to 2.46, while causing only minor degradation in model utility. Our work reveals a covert LLM supply-chain threat that increases inference cost without requiring large volumes of attack requests while largely preserving utility.
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