Cyber-Physical Microgrids Under False Data Injection, Denial-of-Service, and Replay Attacks: A Systematic Review

Abstract

The digitalization of cyber-physical microgrids has improved operational flexibility, distributed control, renewable-energy integration, and supervisory automation, but it has also expanded the communication-layer attack surface of modern power systems. False data injection attacks (FDIAs), denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and replay attacks are prominent threats because they compromise the integrity, availability, and timeliness of measurement, control, and protection data. In inverter-dominated and communication-dependent microgrid environments, these attacks can degrade voltage and frequency regulation, current and power sharing, distributed energy resource coordination, protection automation, and operator situational awareness. This paper presents a systematic, microgrid-centric review of these three attack classes, grounded in a reproducible four-database search executed in August 2026 (3,145 records screened to 261 eligible microgrid-specific studies) and a structured evidence map, and synthesizes attack models, operational impacts, detection methods, mitigation strategies, and resilience-oriented control frameworks.The review covers model-based, observer-based, estimation-driven, and data-driven detection techniques, including machine learning, temporal consistency analysis, digital-twin-assisted monitoring, and protocol-aware intrusion detection for IEC 61850 environments. It also highlights the growing importance of cyber-physical realism in validation, with emphasis on hardware-in-the-loop testing, real-time simulation, and experimentally grounded evaluation platforms. Major research gaps are identified in timing-aware detection, cross-layer attack modeling, robustness under dynamic operating conditions, standardized datasets, and cyber-physical validation. Overall, this review provides a unified microgrid-centric perspective on evolving communication-layer cybersecurity challenges and outlines research directions for developing resilient, deployable, and trustworthy defense mechanisms.