Board Size, Board Independence and Environmental Disclosure in Listed Oil & Gas Companies in Nigeria and Ghana

Abstract

Corporate governance has emerged as a vital driver of transparency and accountability in modern business practice, particularly in environmentally sensitive industries such as oil and gas. This study examines the effect of board structure, with emphasis on board size and board independence, on environmental disclosure among listed oil and gas companies in Nigeria and Ghana. The research was motivated by the growing concerns over environmental degradation, weak disclosure practices, and the need for stronger governance mechanisms in resource dependent economies. Ten companies were selected, seven from Nigeria and three from Ghana covering the period 2012 to 2024. The study employed secondary data extracted from annual reports and sustainability disclosures. Analytical techniques included descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, unit root testing, and robust least squares regression to ensure reliability and robustness of results. The findings revealed two major outcomes. First, board size was found to exert a statistically insignificant effect on environmental disclosure, suggesting that merely increasing the number of directors does not necessarily enhance transparency. Second, board independence showed a significant positive effect on environmental disclosure, indicating that independent directors play a crucial role in strengthening accountability and promoting sustainability reporting. These results align with theoretical expectations from Agency Theory, which emphasizes the monitoring role of independent directors, and Stewardship Theory, which highlights the capacity of board members to act in the best interest of stakeholders. The study concludes that while board size may not directly drive disclosure, board independence remains a critical governance mechanism for advancing environmental accountability. It recommends regulatory reinforcement of independence thresholds, capacity building for directors, and stricter disclosure guidelines.