The Impact and Implications of the Russo-Ukrainian War on Drone Terrorism

Abstract

This study examines changes in drone operations during the Russo-Ukrainian War and assesses the potential adaptation of battlefield-proven drone technologies and tactics for terrorist use, with the aim of drawing implications for South Korea’s counterterrorism policy. It does not classify military operations conducted during an international armed conflict or civilian participation in drone production and support as terrorism. Instead, it focuses on the possibility that publicly disseminated battlefield technologies may be acquired, replicated, and modified by non-state actors for attacks against civilians or non-military facilities. A structured qualitative content analysis was conducted using domestic and international academic literature, government and international-organization reports, and verified open-source materials. Commercial quadcopters, FPV drones, fiber-optic FPV drones, and Shahed-type one-way attack drones were compared according to six criteria: accessibility accessibility accessibility, ease of production and modification, attack effectiveness and precision, ability to evade defensive systems, capacity for mass or simultaneous deployment, and potential adaptation for terrorist use. The findings indicate that commercial quadcopters and FPV drones have relatively high potential for adaptation by non-state actors because of their low cost, accessibility accessibility, precision, and decentralized production. Although fiber-optic FPV drones are more difficult to produce and operate, they are relatively resistant to radio-frequency detection and jamming. When combined with covert launches near a target, these drones may reduce the detection range and response time of conventional perimeter-defense systems. Shahed-type drones are less accessible to ordinary non-state actors but may be acquired and employed by state-sponsored proxy groups as long-range attack systems. The most plausible threat is therefore not the direct transfer of complete military drone systems but the combination of low-cost production using commercial components, precision FPV attacks, covert launches near protected facilities, and the simultaneous deployment of multiple drones. Accordingly, this study recommends establishing an integrated national threat-assessment framework, adopting risk-based protection for critical facilities, developing multisensor detection and identification capabilities, constructing layered electronic and physical defenses, strengthening monitoring of potential launch areas near protected facilities, and improving operator tracing, digital forensics, and coordinated interagency response systems.