Constitutional Bodies and Political Accountability: Strengthening Democratic Institutions in India

Abstract

Constitutional bodies such as the Election Commission of India, the Comptroller and Auditor General, the Union Public Service Commission and the Finance Commission were designed as guarantors of democratic fairness, insulated from the partisan calculus of elected governments. This paper examines whether that insulation has translated into political accountability in India. Using doctrinal and institutional analysis, it draws on constitutional text, Supreme Court jurisprudence, parliamentary data from PRS Legislative Research, election-integrity data from the Association for Democratic Reforms, and developments up to September 2026. Institutions are assessed against three tests: competence, independence from those with an interest in frustrating constitutional norms, and accountability to those with an interest in upholding them. The evidence shows a pattern of insecure independence and under-designed accountability. Appointment processes remain executive-dominated, the first removal notice against a Chief Election Commissioner failed at admission in 2026, parliamentary scrutiny has thinned, and audit reporting has declined in volume. The Supreme Court’s 2026 judgment on the Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls illustrates how judicial deference can enlarge institutional power without enlarging answerability. The paper proposes a seven-part reform agenda covering plural selection panels, removal parity, financial autonomy, reasoned transparency, time-bound duties, mandatory scrutiny, and integrity in political finance.