This work presents the first systematic characterization of SDC vulnerability across major computation interfaces in both the forward and backward passes of Transformer training, and proposes TrainSDC, a characterization-guided protection framework consisting of Q/K-path recomputation, residual-gain monitoring, and exponent-aware gradient scaling.
Abstract
LLM training is increasingly vulnerable to silent data corruption (SDC), yet existing protection methods largely treat Transformer computations uniformly because their vulnerability remains poorly understood. We present the first systematic characterization of SDC vulnerability across major computation interfaces in both the forward and backward passes of Transformer training. Our analysis reveals two distinct error propagation mechanisms: forward-pass vulnerability is highly location dependent, with faults on the Q/K path producing persistent training deviations, whereas backward-pass vulnerability is largely governed by gradient exponent distributions rather than computation locations. Motivated by these observations, we propose TrainSDC, a characterization-guided protection framework consisting of Q/K-path recomputation, residual-gain monitoring, and exponent-aware gradient scaling. Experiments on Llama 3.2-1B and Qwen3-0.6B show that TrainSDC maintains training behavior close to fault-free execution under both sparse and dense fault injection while introducing only 1.65%-6.76% runtime overhead.
We present a new attack that reconstructs the text generated by locally hosted LLMs by observing CPU cache activity during detokenization. Unlike prior attacks that rely on deployment-specific assumptions, such as shared data memory, CPU offloading, or Mixture-of-Experts architectures, our approach targets the detokeni...
Roy Weiss, B. Konstantinov, Eitam Sheetrit et al.· 0 citations
Large Language Models (LLMs) execute billions of floating-point operations per output token across many hardware accelerators. At this scale, hardware-induced faults can bypass system-level detection mechanisms and cause Silent Data Corruption (SDC). Algorithm-Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT) is the state-of-the-art techni...
A. Altenbernd, Dylan Everingham, Philipp Wiesner et al.· 0 citations
A residual-stream covert-channel attack is introduced that maps messages to codewords and injects them into an intermediate residual stream through a compromised runtime hook and is scaled with the local residual norm using the signal-to-residual-norm ratio.
Ming-Yuan Li, Yan-Na Jiang, Guang-Sheng Yu et al.· 0 citations
Fine-tuning-as-a-service enables users to adapt aligned large language models (LLMs) to specialized tasks, but malicious fine-tuning can erode refusal behavior while preserving task performance on legitimate inputs. We revisit recent layer-wise safety diagnostics and find that safety sensitivity is signed: scaling diff...
Hui Zhang, Ya-Chao Yuan, Jia-Yu Wang et al.· 0 citations
Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate strong capabilities in code-related tasks, however their effectiveness in software vulnerability detection (SVD) remains poorly understood due to inadequate evaluation frameworks. Existing benchmarks suffer from training data contamination, isolated function evaluation without c...
Arastoo Zibaeirad, Rodrigo Pato Nogueira, Marco Vieira· IEEE Transactions on Reliabi...· 0 citations
BERM is introduced, a lightweight framework that performs in-situ detection by modeling a host LLM’s internal representations extracted during prefill, adding negligible overhead and reducing incremental inference overhead to near-zero.
Maihao Guo, Chaoyang Zhao, Jin-Qiao Wang· Proceedings of the Thirty-Fi...· 1 citation
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