Entre o desejo e a virtude: Eros, prazer e enkráteia no Sócrates de Xenofonte  

Abstract

This article investigates the relationship between desire, pleasure, and virtue in the representation of Socrates in Xenophon’s Memorabilia. Our argument focuses on the concept of ἐγκράτεια (enkráteia), a fundamental element of Socratic ethics as understood by Xenophon. We begin from the premise that, although desires and pleasures have often been associated with moral disorder in the philosophical tradition of antiquity, Xenophon presents a distinctive Socratic account of human volition. First, we examine two aspects of Xenophon’s understanding of the genesis of human appetites. The first conceives them as bodily-based forces capable of persuading the soul, but not of determining its actions absolutely, since this function belongs to the human soul. The second characterizes them as dispositions implanted by the divine in order to ensure reproduction, preservation, and the continuation of life. We then turn to ἐγκράτεια, understood as a kind of “filter” and as a mechanism for regulating and refining human desires and pleasures. To this end, we engage with recent scholarship in order to examine the distinction between self-mastery and virtue, as well as the psychological mechanisms underlying volitional experience. Finally, we draw on passages from the Memorabilia to substantiate our arguments and turn to the Symposium to illustrate these concepts. Our aim, therefore, is to demonstrate that Xenophon’s Socratic ethics does not advocate the rejection of desire, but rather its rational integration into a virtuous life, in which self-mastery transforms volitional experiences into instruments of pleasure, utility, and moral formation.