Nov 2025· arXiv.org· Vol abs/2511.21799· 1 citation· 105 references
Computer Science
TL;DR
This work shows that the multiplicity within a large Rashomon set enables reactive robustness and increases information leakage, and highlights the dual role of Rashomon sets as both a resource and a risk for trustworthy ML.
Abstract
Real-world machine learning (ML) pipelines rarely produce a single model; instead, they produce a Rashomon set of many near-optimal ones. We show that this multiplicity reshapes key aspects of trustworthiness. At the individual-model level, sparse interpretable models tend to preserve privacy but are fragile to adversarial attacks. In contrast, the diversity within a large Rashomon set enables reactive robustness: even when an attack compromises one model, a practitioner can switch to a different near-optimal model that remains accurate, without retraining. However, the same diversity increases information leakage, as disclosing more near-optimal models provides an attacker with progressively richer views of the training data. This produces a robustness-privacy trade-off governed by diversity, which we analyze theoretically and empirically. Beyond this trade-off, Rashomon sets are stable under small distribution shifts, so a set computed once remains valid under such shifts without re-computation. Our results highlight the dual role of Rashomon sets as both a resource and a risk for trustworthy ML.
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