Why Error Theorists Don’t Need Moral Commitment-Devices

Abstract

The ‘Now What?’ Problem for error theorists concerns what we should do with moral discourse, if it transpires to be systematically untrue. The recommendation that we abolish moral discourse (abolitionism) is often attacked on the basis that it sacrifices the useful functions morality performs. One such function is morality’s use as an intrapersonal commitment-device – it (supposedly) bolsters self-control and prevents us from frustrating our future goals, despite our momentary temptations to do so. Abolitionists attack this argument by claiming that error theorists lack the means to preserve moral judgements as a commitment-device, arguing that (for example) whatever attitudes error theorists could have towards moral claims, they could not be robust enough to inspire the required motivational change (to sustain a commitment-device). Few abolitionists, however, have considered the range of effective amoral commitment-devices at their disposal. In fact, there are good reasons to suspect that these might be as effective as, if not more effective than, moral commitment-devices. If this is true, it demonstrates that preservationists have seriously overestimated the indispensability of moral judgements as commitment-devices.