The Worth of Human Life: A Multidimensional Foundation for Human Rights

Abstract

This article develops a multidimensional account of the worth of human life and explores its implications for the philosophical foundations of human rights. It argues that traditional monistic accounts, whether theological, rationalist, autonomy-based, sentientist, or capability-oriented, capture important aspects of human value but remain limited when treated as exclusive foundations. In response, the article proposes a five-dimensional architecture of human worth composed of (i) biological vitality, (ii) sentient-affective life, (iii) moral capacity, (iv) cognitive-productive power, and (v) relational embeddedness. This structure is understood as interdependent and shared rather than as a set of capacities whose exercise determines moral status. The model explains equal human worth by grounding value in structural participation in the architecture of human life, rather than in the possession or performance of any single faculty. It also clarifies how human rights protect the biological, experiential, moral, cognitive, and relational dimensions of human existence. The article’s contribution is therefore not to replace existing human rights theories, but to offer a more integrative account of the human worth that such theories often presuppose.