When Can Clientelism Serve Democratic Ends? A Democratic Theory of Distributive Politics

Abstract

This article employs normative democratic theory to examine a counterintuitive suggestion raised repeatedly by empirical scholars of clientelism: namely, that practices of particularistic exchange might sometimes serve democratic ends. Certainly, most particularistic practices are widely agreed to undermine democracy, on both intrinsic and instrumental grounds. Yet some observers resist blanket condemnation—and in particular, many highlight the redeeming democratic virtues of certain practices that seem to facilitate collective organization among disempowered groups. Drawing on “realist” approaches to democratic theory, we vindicate this basic insight while clarifying its scope conditions. Countervailing power is a crucial democratic priority, and programmatic methods of promoting it sometimes face serious obstacles: as when clientelist practices are deeply entrenched, or incumbents capture the tools of programmatic competition. Under such conditions, we conclude, democracy-seeking leaders may justifiably employ particularistic practices to promote countervailing power—but only if they respect five constraints tethering them strictly to that goal.