This work proposes Z-PEFT, a lightweight meta-classifier that relies exclusively on layer-wise spectral measures for classification, and achieves the best performance while maintaining low and scalable computational cost among weight-space detectors.
Abstract
Parameter-Efficient Fine-tuned (PEFT) models are frequently downloaded from open repositories by practitioners. This widespread practice creates a significant attack surface, as malicious actors can publish backdoored models that induce specific behaviors in response to predefined triggers. We study the problem of weight-space backdoor detection, where a detector classifier predicts whether a model is malicious using only its weights, enabling a lightweight safety mechanism. Most existing methods are designed and evaluated in a closed-world setting, where the detector is trained and tested on the same attack type. In contrast, we evaluate backdoor detection under novel conditions, including previously unseen attacks and datasets. We propose Z-PEFT, a lightweight meta-classifier that relies exclusively on layer-wise spectral measures for classification. Our experiments show that strong performance in the closed-world setting does not necessarily translate to high accuracy in zero-shot backdoor detection. Among weight-space detectors, Z-PEFT achieves the best performance while maintaining low and scalable computational cost.
This work reveals that backdoor behaviors tend to be absorbed by a simpler parallel branch when jointly trained with the main network, and proposes Trapping and Removing (TR), a simple yet effective training-time defense that introduces a lightweight shortcut branch as a "honeypot" to trap backdoor knowledge.
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RAMP is proposed, an attack enhancement method that uses a genetic algorithm to optimize reversed adversarial perturbations under black-box access and then injects them through functionality-preserving binary manipulations, which substantially improves attack effectiveness over trigger-only baselines.
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DistScan is presented, a backdoor detection framework based on a simple but previously unexploited observation: backdoor injection systematically shifts a model's pre-NMS prediction class distribution away from its training class frequencies, even on clean inputs without any trigger present.
Long-Tian Wang, Zheng-Yu Zhao, Chen-Hao Lin et al.· 0 citations
A reverse-training framework is introduced that weakens the trigger-target association, producing low-ASR backdoor models while preserving clean-input performance and exposing a fundamental attacker-defender asymmetry in existing defense paradigms.
It is demonstrated that source-precision auditing alone does not rule out quantization-triggered behavior and that the final deployed configuration must be included in behavioral certification for trustworthy edge AI.
Jacopo Dardini, Claudio Stanzione, G. Colò et al.· Lecture notes in computer sc...· 0 citations
SpecGuard is introduced, an inference-time backdoor detector that repurposes speculative decoding at zero added model-computation cost and doubles as a free, always-on signal for detecting backdoored LLM behavior.
Wen Rui, Ahmed Salem, Andrew Paverd et al.· 0 citations
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