The political nature of the firm: corporate statecraft and the private production of institutional order in four American cases

Abstract

Abstract Firms adapt to institutional environments. They can also help produce them. At regional scale, a firm may need land-use rules, civic infrastructure, or arrangements for regional cooperation that existing institutions cannot supply. This article develops the concept of corporate statecraft: the purposive production of a place’s institutional order by a private organization. Four American cases ground an abductive inquiry: Terman’s Stanford, Miller’s Cummins, the Allegheny Conference’s Pittsburgh, and Long’s American Woolen. They connect institutional deficits to organizational capability, the decision to deploy it outward, and commitments tying future interests to place. The instruments produced establish terms of participation for independent actors; their continuity depends on where resources and authority reside. Extending the Coase–Williamson–North tradition through Langlois’s account of market-supporting capabilities, the article examines how organizations accept reduced control to coordinate beyond their hierarchies. Corporate statecraft reveals the firm’s political nature in the institutional conditions it helps establish for others.