When, Where, and Why Might Elected Political Elites Reach for Democratic Innovations?

Abstract

Abstract Electoral democracies are under strain. Elections and conventional relations of representation between elected politicians and citizens do not seem to be providing sufficient legitimacy for democratic governance. In principle, democratic innovations such as deliberative minipublics or participatory budgeting could supplement electoral systems so that they function more democratically. But elected representatives may resist these innovations due to unfamiliarity, perceived threats to their power, and the belief that traditional electoral methods suffice for democratic legitimacy. This paper theorizes the potential incentives for elected officials to adopt democratic innovations, examining the conditions under which innovations might align with their interests. Democratic deficits may, and often do, present electoral risks and challenges. By mapping democratic deficits onto elite incentives, we suggest when, where, and why the strategic motivations of elected officials might align with democratic innovations. We illustrate the theory with examples of democratic innovations drawn primarily from the Participedia database. We conclude that strategies for deepening democracy should include understanding how democratic innovations relate to incentives structured by electoral institutions, so that innovations might supplement rather than compete with electoral democracy.