Nov 2026· Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop on Deepfake, Deception, and Disinformation Security· 0 citations· 8 references
Misinformation and Its ImpactsDigital Media Forensic Detection
TL;DR
This paper presents a position and baseline synthesis of Reverse Prompt Engineering (RPE) as a defensive capability, and synthesises representative RPE frameworks while explicitly delineating the evidentiary limits of prompt recovery, attribution, and content provenance.
Abstract
Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) has democratised content creation while scaling systemic threats in Deepfakes, Deception, and Disinformation (D3). As traditional content detection and watermarking are increasingly bypassed, this paper presents a position and baseline synthesis of Reverse Prompt Engineering (RPE) as a defensive capability. RPE inverts the generative pipeline to infer plausible instruction prompts and support, rather than definitively proving source-model attribution. Grounded in threat telemetry, we synthesise representative RPE frameworks while explicitly delineating the evidentiary limits of prompt recovery, attribution, and content provenance. We further evaluate RPE across public information, legal, and policy/governance viewpoints, analyse key technical limitations such as cross-modal generalisation, and outline a research roadmap to establish RPE as a cornerstone of digital provenance and AI accountability.
The safety alignment of large language models (LLMs) faces persistent challenges from jailbreak attacks. While existing methods mostly leverage prompt engineering or adversarial optimization, we identify and formalize an underexplored semantic isomorphism vulnerability where harmful and safe scenarios share highly cons...
Fan Yang, Ke Wang, Wenzhou Dou et al.· IEEE Transactions on Audio,...· 0 citations
An exploratory case study that applies explainable artificial intelligence techniques to analyze how Prompt Guard 2 distinguishes malicious from benign prompts finds that Prompt Guard 2's decisions rely on the cumulative contribution of many tokens rather than a few dominant ones, yet saliency-guided synonym substituti...
Fernando Outeda, Gustavo Betarte, J. Campo et al.· 0 citations
The experience suggests that the PromptOps practices recently proposed for general LLM applications transfer directly to security engineering, and that a fixed evaluation corpus with cost-aware metrics is the single most valuable artifact a prompt-pipeline team can maintain.
Eldar Mametov, Andrey Sadovykh, Eugene Zouev et al.· Proceedings of the 1st Inter...· 0 citations
Safety-aligned large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to adversarial prompts that bypass their safety training. Existing automated red-teaming methods either require privileged access unavailable in production, rely on manually engineered per-model templates, or optimize a single objective without population-le...
Tool-using language-model agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because they must act on untrusted external content. Existing training-time defenses can reduce attack success rates, but often at the cost of general capabilities. We show that training-based defenses induce substantial drift in the model's o...
Mohamed Dhouib, Clément Elliker, Alexi Canesse et al.· 0 citations
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