This work introduces an ensemble defense that consolidates the complementary strengths of individual detectors, making the detection system more backdoor mechanism‐agnostic, and also providing backdoor inversion, which offers insights into the nature of the detected attack.
Abstract
Various defenses have been proposed to counter backdoors in deep neural network classifiers, but due to the diverse mechanisms through which backdoor triggers can be incorporated into data samples, no single defense is universally effective. We introduce an ensemble defense that consolidates the complementary strengths of individual detectors, making the detection system more backdoor mechanism‐agnostic, and also providing backdoor inversion, which offers insights into the nature of the detected attack. Our ensemble defense achieves superior detection performance and more robust, accurate backdoor inversion compared to individual detectors. We also employ mixed clean/dirty‐label backdoor poisoning, a recent X‐to‐X backdoor attack that is more surgical, evasive, and harder to detect than traditional dirty‐label attacks.
A reverse-training framework is introduced that weakens the trigger-target association, producing low-ASR backdoor models while preserving clean-input performance and exposing a fundamental attacker-defender asymmetry in existing defense paradigms.
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to backdoor/Trojan attacks, posing a severe threat to security-critical applications. In this paper, we investigate a scenario in which two different backdoors are successively embedded into one model and report that the later-embedded backdoor has a “suppression” effect on th...
Hong Zhu, Kai Chen, Sheng-Zhi Zhang· IEEE Transactions on Informa...· 0 citations
The aim of a backdoor attack is to manipulate the behavior of a DNN under trigger-activated conditions by poisoning the dataset. Most backdoor detectors can be regarded as feature clustering methods and struggle to detect trigger-injected samples owing to two factors: 1) Most detectors rely heavily on sufficient clean...
Zhi-Xiao Wu, Yao Lu, Yuan-Rong Xu et al.· IEEE Transactions on Informa...· 0 citations
RAMP is proposed, an attack enhancement method that uses a genetic algorithm to optimize reversed adversarial perturbations under black-box access and then injects them through functionality-preserving binary manipulations, which substantially improves attack effectiveness over trigger-only baselines.
Jin-Wen Xin, Dong-Ni Zhang, Chen-Yang Wang et al.· 0 citations
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