A Privacy-Focused, Post-Quantum-Oriented Digital Identity System Using Blockchain and Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Abstract
Digital identity is critical, yet centralized providers create single points of failure—breaches have exposed billions of records—and quantum computing threatens the classical public-key cryptography (RSA/ECC) on which these systems rely. We present a system-level integration of blockchain, zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs), and post-quantum cryptography (PQC) for privacy-preserving digital identity. A blockchain-based decentralized identifier (DID) system removes central databases; all signing and key-encapsulation operations use lattice-based PQC (CRYSTALS-Dilithium and Kyber); and selective disclosure is provided by Groth16 zk-SNARKs, with revocation via on-chain Merkle non-membership accumulators. We specify the full credential lifecycle—issuance, two-phase authentication, and revocation—with an explicit trust boundary separating the in-circuit Groth16 relation from the off-circuit issuer-signature check. We report a measured evaluation on a reference prototype: under liboqs 0.15.0, Dilithium-II signs/verifies in 0.19/0.06 ms and Kyber-512 encapsulates/decapsulates in 0.018/0.022 ms; a single-authentication Groth16 proof over the 21,715-constraint BN254 credential circuit takes <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\approx 981$ </tex-math></inline-formula> ms (snarkJS) and <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\approx 177$ </tex-math></inline-formula> ms (native rapidsnark) on byte-identical inputs, with <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\approx 40$ </tex-math></inline-formula> ms verification, a 723-byte proof, and <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\approx 243$ </tex-math></inline-formula>,000 gas for on-chain verification on a local EVM. A lifecycle harness with a passing revoked-credential negative test validates correctness. The signing and key-encapsulation layers are quantum-safe under current lattice assumptions; the Groth16 proof layer is classically secure only, and its post-quantum migration is identified as future work. End-to-end credential unforgeability is conditioned on an honest holder wallet performing the off-circuit signature check (Assumption 5). Every quantitative claim is labelled measured [M], simulated [S], assumption [A], or future work [F].