CWE-bench is introduced, a private benchmark of 120 held-out repository audit-and-repair tasks spanning 73 CWE types, eight languages, and all OWASP Top 10 2025 categories, showing that no single agent is best across languages or vulnerability categories, and difficulty varies far more by vulnerability category than by language.
Abstract
Cybersecurity evaluations of AI agents have focused largely on offense, yet a working exploit does not show that an agent can make software safe. An attacker needs to exploit only one vulnerability; a defender must find and fix all of them. We introduce CWE-bench, a private benchmark of 120 held-out repository audit-and-repair tasks spanning 73 CWE types, eight languages, and all OWASP Top 10 2025 categories. Agents are given a repository to audit and a description of its threat model, but are not told the weakness, where it occurs, or how many vulnerable sites there are. Each patch must block the exploit while preserving original functionality, as checked by a programmatic verifier. We validated the verifier against a panel of agentic judges, manually reviewing disagreements during development and refining the checks. The best agents reach 68% pass@1 and 81% pass@4. We further conduct analyses showing that (i) agents with the same pass@1 differ widely in retry gains and cost, and (ii) no single agent is best across languages or vulnerability categories, and difficulty varies far more by vulnerability category than by language. As the offensive capabilities of agents improve, CWE-bench provides a broad and rigorous measure of whether their defensive capabilities keep pace.
As autonomous coding agents get increasingly deployed, the risk that accidental or adversarially injected misspecifications in tasks lead to dangerous agent behavior is critical to address. Prior work has shown that agents given such tasks rarely flag the conflict and instead cheat, editing tests or hard-coding expecte...
It is argued that evaluation validity is a prerequisite for, not a footnote to, defense claims in agentic security, and a harness is provided to provide an instrument that enforces it.
CTF-ABACUS is introduced, a trace-based agent auditing framework that reconstructs each run as an evidence-grounded solve profile that provides a basis for designing benchmarks that better isolate the offensive capabilities of autonomous language-model agents.
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