Privacy-Preserving GNN Inference on Financial Transaction Graphs via Homomorphic Encryption

Abstract

Anti-money laundering (AML) in financial networks requires modeling transaction patterns that span multiple institutions. In practice, however, banks cannot share account and transaction features due to strict privacy regulations. We propose a privacy-preserving graph neural network (GNN) inference framework tailored to this multi-bank setting. A central server holds the graph connectivity and pretrained model weights in plaintext, while each bank keeps its transaction features encrypted. Inference is then carried out entirely on encrypted features under the CKKS homomorphic encryption scheme, so that no plaintext transaction features or predictions are exposed to the server. The key to making this practical is an edge-centric GNN architecture, wherein message passing is expressed through operations on node--edge incidence matrices. This formulation not only preserves the edge-attributed multigraph structure of transaction networks but also reduces every aggregation step to plaintext--ciphertext matrix products. Since CKKS can evaluate only polynomial circuits, we also approximate each nonlinearity with a composite polynomial of the sign function, which we calibrate per activation site. On the IBM AML benchmark, our model achieves performance competitive with plaintext baselines, and with a consumer-grade GPU, classifies each queried transaction end-to-end in as little as \textbf{5.31} seconds, while per-transaction latency can be amortized to \textbf{1.65} seconds when optimized for throughput.