Signalling and Moral Ambiguity

Abstract

Moral agents often act under conditions of informational asymmetry: while they may know that their actions are permissible, observers may lack the information needed to reach the same conclusion. This paper explores the ethical significance of such asymmetries. Drawing inspiration from Signalling Theory, I introduce the concept of normative signalling : the idea that agents have moral reasons to choose actions that not only are permissible but also appear unambiguously so to others. I argue that morally ambiguous actions can generate anxiety and undermine trust, allow or demand harmful and unnecessary interventions, and undermine moral education. By analysing a range of cases, I show that reducing moral ambiguity through normative signalling can be a matter of moral responsibility. Further, I show that the strength and scope of this responsibility—like other moral responsibilities for example to be beneficent or kind—is dependent on context, sensitive to costs and so lies on a spectrum from the supererogatory to the morally obligatory. Highlighting the informational value of ethical action, I demonstrate that, in a world where our actions are not—and never can be—completely transparent to others, ethics is fundamentally incomplete if it fails to take into account how our actions play the role of evidence of our moral commitments rather than the mere fulfilment of them. It is therefore of moral importance that not only are our actions permissible but that they are seen to be permissible.