INSTITUTIONAL ASYMMETRY AND THE DYNAMICS OF TRIPARTITE BARGAINING IN MINIMUM WAGE DETERMINATION IN TÜRKİYE

Abstract

This study approaches minimum wage determination in Türkiye not merely as a technical bargaining process over the wage level, but also as a multi-actor decision-making arena jointly shaped by institutional rules, voting arrangements, and power relations among the parties. Its main objective is to explain why, and under what conditions, the outcome of the Minimum Wage Fixing Commission tends to converge toward a structure in which the public side becomes decisive, despite the Commission’s formal tripartite basis of representation. To this end, a three-actor asymmetric bargaining-voting model is developed, comprising labor, employers, and public decision-makers. In the model, the final minimum wage level is defined within a hybrid equilibrium structure that combines the bargaining outcome among the parties with the institutional voting outcome. The institution-specific calibration for Türkiye, however, shows that the public side is not merely a third player but also occupies a pivotal position due to its role in agenda-setting, procedures, and macroeconomic responsibilities. The scenario analysis shows that as conflict between labor and employers demands deepens and procedural asymmetry increases, the weight of the bargaining component weakens and the final outcome moves closer to the public side’s reference wage. These findings suggest that minimum wage decisions in Türkiye are shaped not only by distributive conflict but also by institutional design. The study makes a theoretical contribution to the minimum wage literature by focusing less on the consequences of the minimum wage itself and more on the decision-making mechanism through which that outcome is produced.