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Rust for Secure Backend Development: A Critical Review and Extended Vulnerability Comparison with Node.js and Django

Aug 2026 · 0 citations · 21 references
Computer Science

TL;DR

Results indicate that Rust's compile-time guarantees dominate at the systems layer, while managed backend frameworks offer stronger built-in defenses at the application layer, suggesting that Rust adoption in web contexts requires complementary safeguards rather than reliance on language-level safety alone.

Abstract

The Rust programming language is widely credited with eliminating entire classes of memory-safety and concurrency vulnerabilities, but the security implications of adopting it in practice extend well beyond memory safety. This paper presents a critical review of prior work on Rust's security posture in industrial settings, and extends that analysis in a direction the original study did not cover: backend web development. We first assess the strengths and limitations of the existing vulnerability classification of Rust against C, C++, and Java under the SANS Top 25, OWASP Top 10, and the 19 Deadly Sins of Software Security frameworks, identifying gaps including limited empirical validation, a small interview sample, and the absence of a secure development lifecycle discussion. We then contribute an original comparison of Rust against Node.js and Django using the same three-level classification (Rare and Difficult, Safeguarded, Unprotected), supported by side-by-side code experiments for out-of-bounds writes (CWE-787), use-after-free (CWE-416), and race conditions (CWE-362). Our results indicate that Rust's compile-time guarantees dominate at the systems layer, while managed backend frameworks offer stronger built-in defenses at the application layer, suggesting that Rust adoption in web contexts requires complementary safeguards rather than reliance on language-level safety alone.

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