Aug 2026· IEEE Non-Volatile Memory System and Applications Symposium· pp. 1-6· 0 citations· 14 references
Abstract
Use-After-Free (UAF) remains one of the most critical security threats affecting C/C++ programs. Moreover, the cross-restart persistence semantics of persistent memory (PM) programming models significantly broaden the UAF attack surface. Existing DRAM-based protection schemes lack crash consistency guarantees, whereas existing PM-specific solution, which is based on ASan, suffers from high runtime overhead and offers incomplete protection against UAF. In this paper, we present PMDangNull, a collaborative compiler-allocator protection framework built atop LLVM. PMDangNull instruments protected applications with escape-tracking instructions via a compiler plugin, coordinating with its allocator runtime module to enforce pointer nullification upon deallocation. Experimental results under single-threaded execution with no compiler optimization demonstrate that, compared with the existing solution SafePM, PMDangNull reduces performance and space overheads by up to 62.46% and 41.83%, respectively, and successfully prevents all eight UAF exploits in our test suite.
This work presents PMO Checker, a comprehensive framework for detecting and recovering from security attacks, which includes various invariant checking and checkpointing schemes and is implemented on a real platform with Intel Optane PMem memory.
Naveed Ul Mustafa, Xipeng Shen, Yan Solihin· ACM Transactions on Architec...· 0 citations
It is found that although the new protection measures aimed at stopping popular heap exploit techniques or restricting the exploit strategy space can effectively defend against the exploitation of most vulnerabilities, the attack strategies proposed by this work can still make these vulnerabilities exploitable again.
This paper systematically analyze a set of x86 instructions that directly or indirectly invalidate instruction cache lines, revealing measurable timing asymmetries between cache hits and misses, and shows that these SMC-induced timing artifacts can be leveraged to mount high-resolution cache attacks that are both steal...
Seonghun Son, Daniel Moghimi, Berk Gulmezoglu· ACM Transactions on Architec...· 0 citations
P PTSan is presented, an LLVM sanitizer that makes pointer-based checking practical by storing an object identifier in each pointer's high bits and its bounds in a fixed-size runtime table, and preserving the inter-object, non-object, and temporal detection coverage measured by an independent memory safety test suite.
Eli Davis, Eric Lahtinen, Michael Gordon· arXiv.org· 0 citations
SerMC is proposed, a memory-controller-based tripwire mechanism that validates accesses when metadata arrives from Dynamic Random Access Memory and extends enforcement to DRAM-bound accesses issued by both processors and DMA-capable devices, and provides practical average-case overhead but still exposes a clear worst-c...
Gen Xu, Li Lv, Jiayan Dong· Computers, Materials & C...· 0 citations
StackPatroller is proposed, a stack-integrity-based runtime supervision framework that enforces program integrity through configurable policies that monitors runtime stack contexts to detect early deviations from normal execution, enabling the identification of whole-function reuse and certain forward-edge attacks earl...
Yuanheng Xu, Si-Yu Zhang, Juan Wang et al.· Journal of computing and sec...· 0 citations
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