This paper introduces AgentSafeEvo, a co-evolutionary reinforcement learning framework for agent safety built on an attacker-defender game spanning diverse tasks and attack types, and introduces learnability-guided task weighting, which uses within-task defender-reward variability to adjust each task's contribution to attacker and defender updates.
Abstract
Large language model (LLM) agents accomplish complex tasks through multi-turn interactions with external tools. However, malicious content embedded in user queries, tool descriptions, or environment observations can manipulate their decisions and induce unsafe actions. Adversarial co-evolution has emerged as an effective approach to strengthening LLM safety, but existing work primarily focuses on language-level safety or indirect prompt injection in web tasks. In this paper, we introduce AgentSafeEvo, a co-evolutionary reinforcement learning framework for agent safety built on an attacker-defender game spanning diverse tasks and attack types. The attacker learns to construct adversarial agent tasks that expose weaknesses in the defender's tool use, while the defender learns to complete tasks safely under these attacks. We further introduce learnability-guided task weighting, which uses within-task defender-reward variability to adjust each task's contribution to attacker and defender updates. Extensive experiments on agent safety and general capability benchmarks demonstrate that our method improves adversarial robustness while maintaining general agent capabilities.
Language-model agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) during tool use: adversarial instructions hidden in untrusted tool outputs can covertly redirect legitimate task execution. Existing work often trains and evaluates defenses against fixed attacks that do not adapt to the defender's behavior, so the...
Bo-Yang Zhang, Qing-Xin Xiao, Lingwei Dang et al.· 2 citations
EvoSafeHarness is a safety-specific optimization framework that synthesizes a deployable harness for a frozen model in a target domain, guided by model behavior, domain specifications, and fresh-context adversarial review to reject benchmark-specific rules.
Nanxi Li, Ying-Zi Ma, Yu-Long Cao et al.· 3 citations· ⚡1
Agentic AI architectures leverage LLMs, tool execution, and decision-making mechanisms to handle a variety of tasks that go beyond text generation. The ability of these agents to accomplish such non-textual tasks poses new security concerns, particularly against adversarial prompting attacks. In this paper, we present...
Pradyut Guchhait, G. Saini· International Workshop on Ar...· 0 citations
Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent systems (MAS) to accomplish complex tasks. Prior black-box red-teaming attacks mainly focus on single agents, but we find that these methods are far less effective in MAS, where multiple sub-agents may not directly interact with the user. Theref...
Yu-Qi Jia, Hang-Sheng Zhang, Chen-Xi Liu et al.· 1 citation
Multi-agent debate (MAD) can improve large language model (LLM) reasoning by allowing multiple agents to exchange and critique their answers to the same task. However, the interactions that enable agents to correct mistakes can also spread adversarial errors and steer the agents toward an incorrect answer. Although som...
Yu-Wan Liu, Jia-Ming Zhang, Yue Huang et al.· 0 citations
Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled autonomous web agents to perform complex user tasks by leveraging their adaptive decision-making capabilities. Despite their growing use in crawling the Web, their security implications under indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks remain largely understudied...
Yong-Bi Son, Changoo Lee, Dongwon Shin et al.· Proceedings of the ACM on So...· 0 citations