Rethinking the Concept of the Will in Moral Education: From a Causal View to a Formative View

Abstract

This paper aims to philosophically reexamine the concept of the will, which is closely related to moral practice, in order to address the central question of moral education, namely, "How is moral practice possible?" and to clarify its implications for moral education. To this end, the paper first examines texts by Descartes, Hobbes, and Hume, analyzing the characteristics and limitations of the causal perspective that understands the will as the cause of action in modern philosophy. It then draws on Augustine's early and middle works to present the orientational perspective, which understands the will not merely as a cause of action but as an activity directed toward a particular object and end. Furthermore, by examining Aristotle's works alongside Augustine's later writings, the paper elucidates how the will plays a role in actively shaping the self grounded in reflection on one's own existence and life, and presents this as the formative perspective on the will. Through this discussion, the paper argues that moral practice can be understood not as a single act of will that produces a particular action, but as an ongoing process of reflecting on and actively shaping the life one aspires to lead and the kind of being one seeks to become. Accordingly, moral education should go beyond enabling learners to choose and carry out right actions and help them continually shape the direction of their lives and reflect on who they wish to be and how they wish to live.