Absolute Nothingness: Toward an Ontology Beyond Not-Being

Abstract

Purpose: This article aims to establish that Nothingness and not-being constitute distinct ontological categories despite their frequent conceptual association within the Western philosophical tradition. It proposes an understanding of Nothingness as a prior and non-contingent ontological condition that enables the possibility of being without being reducible to it. Methodology: The study employs a philosophical and comparative analysis of classical metaphysical sources, particularly Aristotle, together with a critical examination of the modern identification of Nothingness with nihilism. On this basis, it examines the conceptual relations among Nothingness, not-being, contingency, potentiality, and ontological becoming. Findings: The analysis shows that not-being is contingent upon the existence of beings and functions as their negation, whereas Nothingness can be conceived as an absolute ontological horizon that is neither dependent on being nor reducible to mere negation. This distinction clarifies conceptual ambiguities concerning contingency, potentiality, and ontological becoming and provides an alternative interpretation of Nothingness beyond negative ontology and nihilistic readings. Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: The article proposes that philosophical approaches to Nothingness should distinguish it more rigorously from not-being and avoid reducing it to nihilism or simple negation. This distinction offers a conceptual framework for further inquiry into the ontological relation between Nothingness and the possibility of being.