USSR as an External Actor in the Nigerian Civil War (1967—1970)

Abstract

The article explores the motives, intentions and actions of the Soviet Union as one of the external actors in the Nigerian civil war (1967—1970). It reveals that the Nigerian crisis was an anomalous phenomenon of the Cold War, when different geopolitical aspirations and national interests, rather than belonging to the Western or Eastern blocs, divided the supporters of the territorial integrity of Nigeria and those who endorsed the secession of Eastern Nigeria (the self-proclaimed Republic of Biafra) in the international arena. Drawing on documents from Russian archives, the author concluded that the USSR was primarily guided by geopolitical and pragmatic imperatives. By becoming the only foreign state to provide the Federal Government of Nigeria with offensive weapons, the USSR secured its role as one of the key external players in the Nigerian crisis. The article traces the negative consequences of the Soviet Union’s position and actions as an external force in the Nigerian civil war, in particular, the problems which arose in its relations with African countries that recognized Biafra. It analyzes the reasons for the impossibility of implementing the secret plans of the Soviet leadership to use military aid to Nigeria to turn it into an ally.