What use the Realist for a Theory of Truth?

Moral uncertainty and imaginative resistance

There has been a recent surge of interest in normative internalism, according to which what you ought to do depends on your beliefs about morality. This view has potentially wide-reaching implications for practical action, policy choice, and societal norms. The view is motivated by certain compelling examples, but in...

Constructive Alternativism and the Assault on Truth

Constructive alternativism, the philosophical position that the universe is always open to alternate interpretations, can be seen as consistent with current political rhetoric stating that conservative operatives are considering “alternative facts”. In this paper, I argue that such an interpretation of constructive alt...

A New Transcendental Argument for Robust Realism

This paper presents a new argument for robust realism, the view about normativity that Philip Stratton‐Lake held. The argument has three main premises: that we cannot believe an error theory about all normative judgements; that trying to endorse the best version of expressivism makes us believe robust realism; and th...

Rationality Without Reasons

This article is concerned with the question: What makes it rational to believe a mathematical statement? It focuses in particular on philosophical questions concerning rationally believing set theoretic axioms. A distinction is drawn between having mathematical warrant and having philosophical warrant for believi...

Can pure epistemic norms be substantial?

Epistemic norms seem to exhibit a substantial normativity in a way that conventional norms or rules of games do not. I argue that we can only allow for this distinction if the epistemic normative domain is not isolated from the broadly practical domain. I contend one cannot have both (a) epistemic purity and (b)...

Scepticism about Epistemic Dilemmas