The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has created a growing asymmetry in cybersecurity, where attack accelerates toward autonomous execution while defense remains predominantly human-intensive. Despite substantial prior work across cyber ranges, AI-driven attack, and AI-driven defense, this asymmetry persists. We trace it to a deeper root cause, that evolution itself has stalled on both sides at three layers. To overcome this, we propose co-evolution as the integrating insight, where attack and defense AI agents autonomously and safely drive each other's evolution through adversarial confrontation. Based on this insight, we present \sysevolve, comprising three co-designed components, \sysfield, \sysspear, and \sysarmor. \sysfield constructs realistic multi-host ranges. \sysspear generates efficient, safe attack schemes. \sysarmor performs real-time, interpretable defense. Together they form a self-driven adversarial loop restoring evolution at all three layers. In evaluation, \sysfield achieves zero-loss collection at 2.1\% overhead and orchestrates 257 CVEs into 1,148 ranges, \sysspear improves attack success by over 25\% over baseline LLMs, and \sysarmor achieves 10--1000$\times$ greater precision than prior systems and detects real APT attacks in production at Huawei and Sangfor. Our evaluation also reveals three findings about LLM agent capabilities. First, multi-step composition and larger topologies expose agent capability gaps hidden by single-step evaluations. Second, the bottleneck lies after initial access in post-compromise state utilization. Third, LLM agents are susceptible to environmental interference. When decoy endpoints are deployed in the range, agent timeouts triple and downstream completion disappears despite the success rates of initial accesses are unchanged.
This work develops a harness-level formulation of runtime defense that systematically characterizes how harness mechanisms enable defense construction and provides a unified view of existing runtime defense interventions from a harness perspective, and proposes HARD (Harness-based Autonomous Runtime Defense Evolution),...
Jia-Jun Ruan, Pei-Yang Li, Yu-Kun Chen et al.· 1 citation
This work proposes Continuous Agents for Injection Threats via Lifelong Yielding Nexus (CAITLYN), an agent-agnostic defense middleware that matches the detection performance of state-of-the-art defenses at lower token overhead than LLM-as-a-judge baselines.
Zi Liang, XiaoYu Xu, Yanyun Wang et al.· 1 citation
BlueSTAR is presented, a tiered agentic architecture for autonomous cyber defense in enterprise IT/OT networks that retains the fast containment of deterministic response for known threats while successfully defending against attacks requiring contextual and cross-cycle reasoning.
Simona Boboila, Xavier F. Cadet, Edward Koh et al.· 0 citations
DARWIN, an evolutionary attack-defense framework that models jailbreaking as a continual process and updates guardrails through an attack-defense loop is proposed, an evolutionary attack-defense framework that models jailbreaking as a continual process and updates guardrails through an attack-defense loop.
This work proposes a self-evolving test-time defense built around a persistent, cross-interaction rule memory that substantially reduces attack success rates while preserving benign utility, remains robust under an adaptive composite-wrapper attack, and does not increase over-refusal as the memory grows.
Tongshen Hu, Bryan Hooi· 0 citations
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